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Summary. Dynamic exchange economies with uncertainty are considered where
the information is released over inﬁnite time. The strong sequential core of such
an economy consists of those consumption streams that can be improved upon by
no coalition at no moment of time. Non-emptiness of the strong sequential core
is established given a high enough discount factor. Moreover, sufﬁcient conditions
are given under which the strong sequential core contains only time and history
independent consumption streams.
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1 Introduction
One of the major difﬁculties in modeling cooperation in a dynamic environment
is the potential abundance of opportunities for coalitions to deviate from earlier
agreements. As the initial positions of agents and coalitions and their preferences
may change over time, a contract that was originally considered acceptable may no
longer be so after some time. Thus, agents or coalitions may tend to break agree-
ments reached earlier in the game. In the case of uncertainty, where information
becomes available over time, this is even more likely to occur.What was perceived
 Jean-Jacques Herings would like to thank the Netherlands Organization for Scientiﬁc Research for
ﬁnancial support.
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as an acceptable agreement when no information was available, may no longer be
so after some information has been released.
In a dynamic economy the classical core concept as introduced in Aumann
(1961) is still meaningful.A consumption stream is an element of the classical core
if no coalition can make its members better off by pooling their own resources and
deviating at period zero for the rest of the time. The classical core, however, ignores
incentives for coalitional improvement that may arise in subsequent periods. It is
essentially a static concept, for it does not depend on the time or the information
structure of the economy.
These considerations motivate the search for a core concept that offers a more
appropriate view on cooperation taking place in a dynamic, rather than a static
environment. Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1999) and Serfes (2001) consider the
concepts of the private core and the non-myopic core in dynamic differential in-
formation economies. They study the evolution of core allocations, as the agents
acquire more information through time. To the best of our knowledge, the con-
cept of the so-called sequential core was ﬁrst proposed in Gale (1978) in a model
of a monetary economy. Other core concepts that take into account the dynamic
structure of the environment have been proposed in Repullo (1988), Koutsougeras
(1998), and Filar and Petrosjan (2000). Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2001) distin-
guish between a strong and a weak version of the sequential core. They study both
concepts in a deterministic setting where agents face a ﬁnite sequence of transfer-
able utility games. In Predtetchinski, Herings, and Peters (2002) the notion of the
strong sequential core is applied to an economy with two periods and uncertainty
where agents are given a possibility to exchange assets in the ﬁrst period.
Despite the differences in the models, the mentioned papers of Gale (1978),
Kranich et al. (2001), and Predtetchinski et al. (2001) share a common approach
to the deﬁnition of the strong sequential core. The dynamic nature of the economy
allows for a number of sub-economies to be identiﬁed. The consumption stream
is then said to be a strong sequential core-element if it belongs to the classical
core of each of the sub-economies of the original dynamic economy. Hence, at no
particular moment can a coalition improve by deviating for the rest of time.
In Predtetchinski, Herings, and Peters (2002) the strong sequential core is de-
ﬁned in such a way that, as a set, it is weakly increasing in the number of assets. In
this sense, the presence of assets can potentially lead to non-emptiness of the strong
sequential core. Nevertheless, a number of negative results is established even in
this context. Generic emptiness is shown in the setting of a ﬁnance economy with
incomplete markets, and an example of emptiness is presented even for asset struc-
tures satisfying a very strong condition of completeness. The general conclusion
is that, unless a complete set of state-contingent contracts is available for trade,
non-emptiness of the strong sequential core cannot be guaranteed.
These negative results provide a motivation to augment the basic model in
a different direction, namely to consider a dynamic exchange economy with an
inﬁnite time horizon. At each moment of time the economy is in one of a ﬁnite
number of states. The state determines the consumption sets, the instantaneous
utility functions, and the initial endowments of all agents at that moment of time.
Transition from one state to the next occurs according to a given Markov process.
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The main result of the paper states that the strong sequential core of a dynamic
exchange economy is non-empty, provided that the discount factor that agents
apply to future utility streams is sufﬁciently close to one.
In more detail, the content of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 a dynamic
exchange economy is introduced, and the concepts of the classical core and of the
strong sequential core are discussed. In Section 3 a characterization of the strong
sequential core is developed. We show that the classical core consists only of time
and history independent consumption streams. This property of the core allows
for a representation of a dynamic sub-economy by means of a ﬁnite-dimensional
static evaluation economy. We prove that the strong sequential core is non-empty
if and only if cores of the evaluation economies have a non-empty intersection.
This result should be seen as closely related to the idea of a value function in
dynamic programming. Section 4 presents an example illustrating a non-emptiness
criterion for the strong sequential core. Section 5 provides a non-emptiness result
for the strong sequential core. More precisely, this result says that a competitive
equilibrium allocation of a speciﬁc limit economy is in the strong sequential core
whenever the discount factor is sufﬁciently close to one. Section 6 concludes.
2 Dynamic exchange economies
A dynamic exchange economy is given by the tuple
E =
〈
N,S, L, (Xis, u
i
s, e
i
s)
i∈N
s∈S , π, δ
〉
.
The ingredients of a dynamic exchange economy E are as follows. The set N =
{1, . . . , n} is the set of agents andS = {1, . . . , S} is the set of states. The symbolL
denotes the number of consumption goods in each state and each time period. The
symbolsXis, uis, and eis denote, respectively, the consumption set, the instantaneous
utility function, and the vector of initial endowments of agent i ∈ N in state
s ∈ S. The matrix π = (π(σ|s))σ,s∈S is a column stochastic matrix of transitional
probabilities: for any σ and s in S, π(σ|s) is the transition probability from state s
to state σ. We assume that the agents’ preferences over consumption streams can
be represented by the expected discounted utility function. The discount factor is
given by δ.
The basic assumption of the model is the following:
Assumption A.
(A1) For all i ∈ N and s ∈ S the consumption set Xis is a non-empty, convex,
closed, bounded from below subset of RL.
(A2) For all i ∈ N and s ∈ S the instantaneous utility function uis : Xis → R is
continuous and concave.
(A3) For all i ∈ N and s ∈ S, the vector of initial endowments eis is an element
of the consumption set Xis.
(A4) The matrix π is irreducible.
(A5) δ ∈ (0, 1).
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Figure 1.A date-event tree with S = 2
A dynamic exchange economy is an economy with inﬁnite time horizon, so the
set of time periods or dates is T = {0, 1, . . . t, . . . }. At each date t ∈ T the state
takes on one of the values from the set S determining the consumption sets, the
instantaneous utility functions, and the initial endowments of all agents at date t.
The state follows a Markov process with one-step transitional probabilities given
by π. At date t = 0 the state is known to be s0 ∈ S.
A date-event tree describes the set of all contingencies that may potentially arise
during the course of the game. Formally, it is the set D deﬁned as follows:
D =
{
(t, s0, s1, . . . , st) | t ∈ T, sτ ∈ S for all τ ∈ {1, . . . t}
}
.
The elements of the date-event tree are called nodes. Node ξ = (t, s0, s1, . . . , st)
of the date-event tree summarizes the information available to agents at time t. This
information includes the current date t at the node ξ, the history (s0, s1, . . . , st−1)
of the state of nature preceding date t, and the current state st at node ξ. The
mapping t : D → T assigns to each node ξ ∈ D its current date t(ξ). The mapping
s : D → S assigns to node ξ its current state s(ξ).
For the case S = 2 the date-event tree is partially reproduced in Figure 1.
Numbers in bold type indicate the current states.
Node ξ = (t, s0, s1, . . . , st) of the date-event tree gives rise to a subtree D(ξ)
deﬁned as follows:
D(ξ) =
{
(τ, σ0, σ1, . . . , στ ) ∈ D | τ ≥ t, σk = sk for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t}
}
.
The probability that the node η = (τ, σ0, σ1, . . . , στ ) will be reached conditional
on the fact that the node ξ = (t, s0, s1, . . . , st) has been reached is deﬁned by the
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following formula:
ρ(η|ξ) =

1, if η = ξ∏τ
k=t+1 π(σk|σk−1), if η ∈ D(ξ) and τ > t
0, otherwise.
A mapping X i : D → RL is called the consumption stream of agent i ∈ N
if its value X iξ at every node ξ of the date-event tree belongs to the consumption
set Xis(ξ) of agent i. The collection of the consumption streams X = 〈X i〉i∈Q is
called a commodity allocation for the coalition of agents Q ⊆ N .
The expected discounted utility of the consumption stream X i of agent i at the
node ξ is given by the function
Vi
D(ξ)(X i) =
∑
η∈D(ξ)
ρ(η|ξ)δt(η)−t(ξ)uis(η)(X iη). (1)
Given a dynamic exchange economy E and a node ξ of the date-event tree, let
ED(ξ) denote the subeconomy of E starting at the node ξ.
We continue with the deﬁnitions of the classical core for the subeconomyED(ξ)
and of the strong sequential core for the economyE. Essentially, the former deﬁni-
tion requires that no coalition be able tomake all its members better off by deviating
at node ξ for the rest of time. The latter deﬁnition requires that no coalition be able
to improve by deviating at any of the nodes of the date-event tree. In this way, the
strong sequential core eliminates any incentives for coalitions to ﬁrst agree to a
proposed allocation but break the agreement later on.
Deﬁnition 1. A commodity allocationX = 〈X i〉i∈N belongs to the classical core
C
(
ED(ξ)
)
of the sub-economy ED(ξ) if
1.
∑
i∈N X iη =
∑
i∈N e
i
s(η) for all η ∈ D(ξ),
2. there exist no coalitionQ ⊆ N and no commodity allocationY = 〈Yi〉i∈Q such
that
∑
i∈Q Yiη =
∑
i∈Q e
i
s(η) for all η ∈ D(ξ) and ViD(ξ)(Yi) > ViD(ξ)(X i) for
all i ∈ Q.
Deﬁnition 2. The strong sequential core of the dynamic exchange economy E is
the set of commodity allocations
SSC(E) :=
⋂
ξ∈D
C
(
ED(ξ)
)
.
3 A characterization of the strong sequential core
An important role in the characterization of the strong sequential core is played
by time and history independent consumption streams. Consumption stream X i of
agent i is said to be time and history independent if the value for X iξ depends on the
current state s(ξ) only. Given an element xi of the set
∏
σ∈SX
i
σ , let {xi} denote
the time and history independent consumption stream X i : D → RL deﬁned
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by X iξ = xis(ξ) for all ξ ∈ D. Let {x} denote the time and history independent
commodity allocation
〈{xi}〉
i∈N .
The evaluation economies constitute another important aspect of the charac-
terization of the strong sequential core. Let IS denote the S-dimensional identity
matrix. Observe that the matrix IS − δπ is invertible, since the spectral radius of
the matrix δπ equals δ < 1. Let ψ = (IS − δπ)−1, and for every pair of states σ
and s let ψ(σ|s) denote an element of the matrix ψ at the intersection of row σ and
column s. If the matrix π is irreducible, then ψ(σ|s) > 0 for all σ, s ∈ S.
Deﬁnition 3. The evaluation economy Es in state s is the pure exchange economy
where RSL is the commodity space, Xi =
∏
σ∈SX
i
σ is agent i’s consumption set,
ei = (eiσ)σ∈S is the vector of initial endowments, and vis : Xi → R is the utility
function deﬁned by
vis(x
i) =
∑
σ∈S
ψ(σ|s)uiσ(xiσ).
Lemma 1 below clariﬁes the role of the evaluation economies in our analysis. The
economy Es can be thought of as a static (“normal form”) representation of the
subeconomy ED(ξ) starting at the node ξ with current state s.
Lemma 1. Vi
D(ξ)
({xi}) = vis(ξ)(xi) for all ξ ∈ D and xi ∈ Xi.
Proof. Let ξ ∈ D be given. First we argue that
ψ(σ|s(ξ)) =
∑
η∈D(ξ)
s(η)=σ
ρ(η|ξ)δt(η)−t(ξ). (2)
Indeed, the right-hand side of equation (2) can be written as∑
τ∈T
δτ
[∑
η
ρ(η|ξ)
]
,
where the sum in square brackets is taken over all nodes η ∈ D(ξ) such that t(η) =
t(ξ)+ τ and s(η) = σ. The expression in square brackets gives the probability that
state σ will be reached from state s(ξ) in exactly τ periods. It is therefore equal to
the entry of the matrix πτ at the intersection of row σ and column s(ξ). Hence, the
right-hand side of equation (2) equals the entry of the matrix ∑τ∈T δτπτ at the
intersection of row σ and column s(ξ). Finally, observe that
∑
τ∈T δ
τπτ = ψ.
Given xi ∈ Xi, the expected discounted utility of the consumption stream {xi}
at node ξ can be written as
Vi
D(ξ)({xi}) =
∑
σ∈S
∑
η∈D(ξ)
s(η)=σ
ρ(η|ξ)δt(η)−t(ξ)uiσ(xiσ)
=
∑
σ∈S
ψ(σ|s(ξ))uiσ(xiσ)
= vis(ξ)(x
i).
unionsq
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Theorem 1 provides a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a given time and
history independent commodity allocation to be an element of the strong sequential
core.
Theorem 1. Let E be a dynamic exchange economy satisfying assumption A. Let
X = {x} be a time and history independent commodity allocation. Then
1. X ∈ C(ED(ξ)) if and only if x ∈ C
(Es(ξ)).
2. X ∈ SSC(E) if and only if x ∈ C(Es) for all s ∈ S.
Proof. Let the time and history independent commodity allocation X = {x} be
given. To prove the ﬁrst part of Theorem 1we demonstrate that a coalitionQ ⊆ N is
able to improve uponX in the subeconomyED(ξ) if and only if it can improve upon
x in the evaluation economy Es(ξ). The second part of Theorem 1 is an immediate
corollary of the ﬁrst part.
Suppose that there is a deviation y from x by a coalition Q in the evaluation
economy Es(ξ). Lemma 1 implies that the time and history independent commodity
allocation {y} is a deviation from the allocation {x} in the subeconomy ED(ξ).
Suppose that there is a deviation Y from the allocation {x} by a coalition Q
in the subeconomy ED(ξ). Note that the allocation Y need not be time and history
independent. In the remainder of the proof we show that there does exist a time and
history independent allocationZ = {z} that (a) is feasible forQ and (b) gives each
member of the coalitionQ at least as high expected discounted utility at node ξ asY
does.An allocationZ having these properties is a deviation from the allocation {x}
in the subeconomy ED(ξ). By Lemma 1, z is a deviation from x in the evaluation
economy Es(ξ).
Deﬁne z by
ziσ =
1
ψ(σ|s(ξ))
∑
η∈D(ξ)
s(η)=σ
ρ(η|ξ)δt(η)−t(ξ)Yiη, (3)
for all i ∈ Q and σ ∈ S. As the allocation Y is feasible for coalition Q, and
the consumption sets Xiσ are assumed to be bounded from below for all i ∈ Q,
the consumption stream Yi is bounded. Hence, the sum in equation (3) is well-
deﬁned. Equation (2) implies that ziσ is a convex combination of the values for the
consumption streamYi at all nodes η in the subtreeD(ξ)with s(η) = σ. For all such
nodes, Yiη ∈ Xiσ . Since the set Xiσ is assumed to be closed and convex, ziσ ∈ Xiσ .
Moreover, z is feasible for Q. Continuity and concavity of the instantaneous utility
functions imply the inequalities
uiσ(z
i
σ) ≥
1
ψ(σ|s(ξ))
∑
η∈D(ξ)
s(η)=σ
ρ(η|ξ)δt(η)−t(ξ)uiσ(Yiη), (4)
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for all i ∈ Q, σ ∈ S. By Lemma 1, the discounted expected utility of the con-
sumption stream Zi = {zi} is
Vi
D(ξ)(Zi) =
∑
σ∈S
ψ(σ|s(ξ))uiσ(ziσ)
≥
∑
σ∈S
∑
η∈D(ξ)
s(η)=σ
ρ(η|ξ)δt(η)−t(ξ)uiσ(Yiη)
=
∑
η∈D(ξ)
ρ(η|ξ)δt(η)−t(ξ)uis(η)(Yiη)
= Vi
D(ξ)(Yi)
for all i ∈ Q. unionsq
Theorem 2 gives sufﬁcient conditions for the classical core to contain only time
and history independent commodity allocations.
Theorem 2. Let E be a dynamic exchange economy satisfying assumption Ain
which π(σ|s) > 0 for all σ, s ∈ S, Xiσ = RL+, uiσ are strongly monotone1 for all
i ∈ N, σ ∈ S and strictly concave for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, σ ∈ S. Then the
classical core of the economy E contains no time or history dependent commodity
allocations.
Proof. Let X be an N -feasible commodity allocation. If the allocation X is not
time and history independent, then there exists a pair of nodes λ, ς ∈ D with the
same current state σ such that X i0λ 	= X i0ς for some i0 ∈ N . Observe that both X iλ
and X iς are elements of the consumption set Xiσ for all i ∈ N .
Let ρ(λ) and ρ(ς) be probabilities to reach nodes λ and ς conditional on the ini-
tial node (0, s0). Under the assumption that all transition probabilities are positive,
ρ(λ) and ρ(ς) are both positive. Deﬁne an element y˜iσ of the set Xiσ as
y˜iσ =
δt(λ)ρ(λ)X iλ + δt(ς)ρ(ς)X iς
δt(λ)ρ(λ) + δt(ς)ρ(ς)
.
By concavity of the instantaneous utility functions,
uiσ(y˜
i
σ) ≥
δt(λ)ρ(λ)uiσ(X iλ) + δt(ς)ρ(ς)uiσ(X iς )
δt(λ)ρ(λ) + δt(ς)ρ(ς)
. (5)
for all i ∈ N .
Since
∑
i∈N X iη =
∑
i∈N X iς , theremust be i1 ∈ N\{i0} such thatX i1λ 	= X i1ς .
As the requirement of strict concavity is violated for at most one agent, the utility
function uiσ must be strictly concave either for i = i0 or for i = i1. Thus, inequality
(5) is strict for at least one agent in the economy. Hence, an N -feasible allocation
1 The functionuiσ is stronglymonotone if the following condition is satisﬁed:
[
xiσ , y
i
σ ∈ RL+, xiσl ≥
yiσl ∀ l ∈ {1, . . . , L}, xiσ = yiσ
]
implies
[
uiσ(xiσ) > uiσ(yiσ)
]
.
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yσ can be constructed in such a way that, when it is substituted for y˜σ in (5), the
inequalities become strict for all i ∈ N . 2
Deﬁne the consumption stream Yi of agent i as follows:
Yiη =
{
X iη, if η ∈ D\{λ, ς}
yiσ, if η = λ, or η = ς.
Then the discounted expected utility of the consumption stream Yi at the initial
node is greater than that of the consumption stream X i for every member i of
coalition N . Hence, allocation Y is a utility improving deviation by coalition N
from allocation X . unionsq
We conclude this section with a characterization of the strong sequential core.
Corollary 1. Let E be a dynamic exchange economy satisfying all assumptions
of Theorem 2. Then
SSC(E) =
{
{x}
∣∣∣∣∣x ∈ ⋂
s∈S
C(Es)
}
.
In the special case with only one state of nature the strong sequential core
SSC(E) coincideswith the classical coreC(E). Both the strong sequential core and
the classical core consist of those consumption allocations where some distribution
of initial endowments x is repeated each period of time, with x being a core-
element of the evaluation economy E1. Thus SSC(E) is non-empty. As Corollary
1 indicates, however, if there are at least two states of nature, and if the cores of
the evaluation economies in different states are disjoint, then the strong sequential
core is empty. The following example illustrates the point.
4 An example
Consider a dynamic exchange economy with two agents called a and b, two states
(S = 2), and a single consumption good in each state (L = 1). The instantaneous
utility functions are
uis(x
i
s) = ln(x
i
s), i = a, b.
2 The allocation yσ can be constructed as follows. Suppose that inequality (5) is strict for agent
i0. If y˜i0σ were a zero vector, then strong monotonicity would imply that the inequalities ui0σ (y˜i0σ ) ≤
ui0σ (X i0λ ) and ui0σ (y˜i0σ ) ≤ ui0σ (X i0ς ) hold, contradicting the supposition. Hence, y˜i0σl0 is non-zero for
some good l0 ∈ {1, . . . , L}. Let
yiσl =


y˜iσl, if l ∈ {1, . . . , L}\{l0}, i ∈ N,
y˜iσl −  if l = l0, i = i0,
y˜iσl +
1
n−1  if l = l0, i ∈ N\{i0}.
Then by strong monotonicity, uiσ(yiσ) > uiσ(y˜iσ) for all  > 0 and all i ∈ N\{i0}. Moreover,  > 0
can be chosen small enough for the vector yi0σ to lie in the consumption set Xi0σ and to preserve strict
inequality in (5).
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For a moment, we leave the matrix of transitional probabilities and the initial en-
dowments unspeciﬁed. Aggregate endowment of the consumption good in state σ
is denoted by eNσ , and eN ∈ RS is the vector of aggregate endowments across all
states.
The set of Pareto-efﬁcient allocations of the evaluation economy coincides with
the diagonal of the Edgeworth box. That is, distribution x of the initial endowments
is Pareto-efﬁcient if agents’ consumption bundles xi are proportional to eN . For a
Pareto-efﬁcient allocation to be in the core of the evaluation economy, the share of
the aggregate endowment accrued to each agent should be large enough, so that the
conditions of individual rationality hold. Formally,
C(Es) =
(xa, xb) ∈ RS × RS
∣∣∣∣∣ ∃ ta, tb > 0 :
ta + tb = 1
xi = tieN , i = a, b
ti ≥ tis, i = a, b
 .
The value for tis is determined by the condition of individual rationality for agent
i. It depends on the fundamentals of the dynamic exchange economy as follows:
tis =
∏
σ∈S
(
eiσ
eNσ
)(1−δ)ψ(σ|s)
.
Any allocation in the core of the evaluation economy is wholly determined by
ta, the share of the aggregate endowment enjoyed by agent a. In state s the lower
value for ta is tas , while the upper value is 1 − tbs. We know (see Corollary 1) that
the strong sequential core is non-empty if and only if the cores of the evaluation
economies in different states have a non-empty intersection. In our example, this
is equivalent to the condition that the intervals [ta1 , 1 − tb1] and [ta2 , 1 − tb2] overlap.
Figure 2 pictures these intervals for various values of the discount factor δ. To
produce this ﬁgure the transitional probabilities and the initial endowments were
speciﬁed as follows:
π =
[
0.75 0.25
0.25 0.75
]
, ea =
[
4
1
]
, eb =
[
1
4
]
.
We see that for the values of δ smaller than, approximately, 0.8, the cores of
the evaluation economies are disjoint, and consequently the strong sequential core
is empty. In contrast, for δ greater than 0.8 the strong sequential core is non-empty.
The example therefore suggests that the more patient individuals are, the more
likely it is that the strong sequential core is non-empty. The next section validates
this suggestion for the general case.
5 A non-emptiness result
In this section we consider a family of dynamic exchange economies Eδ param-
eterized by a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). We will prove that the strong sequential
core of the economy Eδ is non-empty whenever δ is sufﬁciently close to one.
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Figure 2. The cores of the evaluation economies
Our approach is to compute the limits for the utility functions vis as δ approaches
one, and next to construct an economy using the resulting utility functions. This
artiﬁcial economy will then provide us with some plausible candidates to belong
to the strong sequential core of the original dynamic economy.
Throughout this section we write ψ(σ|s; δ) for the elements of the matrix ψ to
emphasize their dependence on the discount factor. The utility functions vis(·) of
the evaluation economies Es depend on the discount factor via ψ; we write vis(·, δ)
and Esδ .
Clearly, ψ(σ|s, δ) explodes as δ approaches one. When multiplied by (1 − δ),
however, it converges to a well-deﬁned limit.
Theorem 3. Suppose that the matrix π is irreducible. Then the limit
φ(σ|s) := lim
δ→1
(1 − δ)ψ(σ|s, δ)
exists for all σ, s ∈ S. Moreover,
(1) the values of φ(σ|s) are independent of s, i.e. φ(σ|s) = φ(σ|s′) for all s, s′ ∈
S;3
(2) φ(σ) > 0 for all σ ∈ S;
(3) the vector (φ(σ))σ∈S is the eigenvector of the matrix π corresponding to the
eigenvalue λ = 1.
3 In what follows we suppress the argument s of φ.
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Proof. Let λ1, . . . , λm (m ≤ S) be the distinct eigenvalues of the matrix π.
The matrix π is a column stochastic matrix, i.e. its entries in a given column
add up to 1. This implies that λ1 = 1 is an algebraically (and hence geometrically)
simple eigenvalue of thematrixπ; that the vector1 = (1, . . . , 1) is the eigenvector
of the matrix π corresponding to the eigenvalue λ1, and that the eigenvector of
the matrix π corresponding to λ1 can be set positive.
Let π = TΛT−1 be the Jordan decomposition of the matrix π, where Λ is a
Jordan form. There is a unique Jordan block corresponding to the eigenvalue λ1
and this block has order 1. Hence, Λ can be written as
Λ =
(
1 0
0 Γ
)
,
where Γ is a direct sum of those Jordan blocks that correspond to eigenval-
ues λ2, . . . , λm. Observe that the matrix (IS−1 − δΓ ) is non-singular for all
δ ∈ (0, 1)\⋃mj=2 {λ−1j }. Moreover, the matrix (IS−1 − Γ ) is non-singular.
The ﬁrst column of the matrix T , denoted cn1T and the ﬁrst row of the matrix
T−1, denoted rw1T−1 are the eigenvectors of the matrices π and π, respectively.
We can therefore set
cn1T >> 0
rw1T
−1 = α 1
for some nonzero scalar α. Using the Jordan decomposition of the matrix π we can
write
(IS − δπ)−1 = T (IS − δΛ)−1T−1, where
(IS − δΛ)−1 =
[
(1 − δ)−1 0
0 (IS−1 − δΓ )−1
]
.
Since (IS−1 − Γ ) is invertible,
lim
δ→1
(1 − δ)(IS − δΛ)−1 = diag{1,0}.
Therefore,
lim
δ→1
(1 − δ)(IS − δπ)−1 = T diag{1,0} T−1 =
= cn1T · rw1T−1 = α cn1T · 1. (6)
The following observations complete the proof of Theorem 1:
(1) φ(σ|s) is given by the entryσ of the vectorα·cn1T and therefore is independent
of s.
(2) φ(σ|s) is non-negative, since by deﬁnition it is the limit of a positive-valued
function. As the vector cn1T has been set positive, Equation (6) implies that α
is positive. Hence, φ(σ|s) is, in fact, positive.
(3) The vector φ = α · cn1T is the eigenvector of the matrix π corresponding to
the eigenvalue λ1. unionsq
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Deﬁnition 4. The symbol E∞ denotes a pure exchange economy in which RSL
is the commodity space, Xi =
∏
σ∈SX
i
σ is the consumption set, ei = (eiσ)σ∈S is
the vector of initial endowments, and ϑi : Xi → R is the utility function deﬁned
by
ϑi(xi) =
∑
σ∈S
φ(σ)uiσ(x
i
σ).
Theorem 4. Let Eδ be a family of dynamic exchange economies, satisfying as-
sumptionA, in which the instantaneous utility functions uis are strictly concave and
locally non-satiated for all i ∈ N , and s ∈ S. Let x be an equilibrium allocation
of the economy E∞. Then there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that {x} ∈ SSC(Eδ) for
all δ ∈ (δ, 1).
To prove Theorem 4 we ﬁrst establish an auxiliary lemma. Let
Xσ(Q) =
{
xσ ∈
∏
i∈Q X
i
σ
∣∣∣ ∑i∈Q xiσ =∑i∈Q eiσ} ,
X(Q) =
∏
σ∈SXσ(Q).
Let PQ(E∞) denote the set of weakly efﬁcient allocations for a coalition Q in the
economy E∞. Recall that x ∈ PQ(E∞) if and only if x ∈ X(Q) and there is no
y ∈ X(Q) such that ϑi(yi) > ϑi(xi) for all i ∈ Q. The set PQ(Esδ) is similarly
deﬁned for the evaluation economy Esδ .
Lemma 2. Let Eδ be a family of dynamic exchange economies satisfying assump-
tion A. Then PQ(E∞) = PQ(Esδ) for all Q ⊆ N , s ∈ S and δ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. An allocation x is an element of PQ(E∞) if and only if there exist weights
αi ≥ 0 (i ∈ Q), ∑i∈Q αi = 1, such that x maximizes the function∑
i∈Q
αiϑi(xi) =
∑
σ∈S
φ(σ)
∑
i∈Q
αiuiσ(x
i
σ)
over the set X(Q). Since the values of φ(·) are positive, this is equivalent to the
requirement that xσ maximizes the function∑
i∈Q
αiuiσ(x
i
σ)
over Xσ(Q) for all σ ∈ S. Again, since the values of ψ(·) are positive, this is
equivalent to the condition that x maximizes the function∑
σ∈S
ψ(σ|s, δ)
∑
i∈Q
αiuiσ(x
i
σ) =
∑
i∈Q
αivis(x
i, δ)
over X(Q). This last condition is equivalent to x ∈ PQ(Esδ). unionsq
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Proof of Theorem 4. Wehave to show that for all values of δ sufﬁciently close to one
and for all s ∈ S, the allocation x is in the core of the economy Esδ (see Theorem 1).
Suppose that this is not the case. Then there exist a state s ∈ S, coalition Q ⊆ N ,
sequences δm ∈ (0, 1) and x(m) ∈ X(Q) such that
lim δm = 1,
vis
(
xi(m); δm
)
> vis
(
xi; δm
) ∀ i ∈ Q. (7)
Since X(Q) is a compact set, there is a subsequence of x(m) converging to an
element x ofX(Q). Premultiplying inequality (7) by (1−δm), replacing sequences
by subsequences and taking the limit yields
ϑi(xi) ≥ ϑi(xi), ∀ i ∈ Q. (8)
Let p be a vector of prices corresponding to equilibrium allocation x. Under the
assumption of local non-satiation of the instantaneous utility functions, inequalities
(8) imply that
pxi ≥ pei, ∀ i ∈ Q. (9)
If there were some strict inequality in (9), then xwould not be feasible for coalition
Q. Hence,
pxi = pei, ∀ i ∈ Q.
The strict concavity assumption implies that there exists a unique maximizer of the
utility function ϑi in the budget set at prices p, i.e.
xi = xi, ∀ i ∈ Q.
Hence, (xi)i∈Q ∈ X(Q). This implies that the allocation (xi)i∈Q is not only
feasible, but alsoweakly efﬁcient for themembers of the coalitionQ in the economy
E∞.According to Lemma 2, however, the set of weakly efﬁcient allocations for any
coalition in the economy E∞ coincides with that in the economy Esδ for all s ∈ S
and δ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, (xi)i∈Q is weakly efﬁcient for Q in the economies Esδ
as well. This contradicts, however, the original assumption. unionsq
It remains to give explicit assumptions that will guarantee existence of an equi-
librium for the economy E∞. We require that the instantaneous utility functions be
strongly monotone and that the aggregate endowments of commodities be positive.
Corollary 2. Let Eδ be a family of dynamic exchange economies, satisfying as-
sumption A, in which the instantaneous utility functions uis are strictly concave
and strongly monotone for all i ∈ N and s ∈ S, and ∑i∈N eisl > 0 for all
l ∈ {1, . . . , L} and s ∈ S. Then there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that SSC(Eδ) 	= ∅
for all δ ∈ (δ, 1).
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An example below shows that a violation of the strict concavity assumption in
Corollary 2 may result in the strong sequential core being empty for all values of
the discount factor.
Example. Consider a familyEδ of dynamic exchange economies with three agents
called a, b, and c, two states (S = 2), and a single consumption good in each state
(L = 1). The state-independent instantaneous utility functions are
uiσ(x
i
σ) = ln(x
i
σ), x
i
σ > 0, i = a, b,
ucσ(x
c
σ) = x
c
σ, x
c
σ ≥ 0.
Notice that the function ucσ is not strictly concave, thus violating one of the as-
sumptions of Corollary 2. The initial endowments and the transition probabilities
are speciﬁed as follows:
ea =
[
4
1
]
, eb =
[
1
4
]
, ec =
[
5
5
]
, π =
[
0.25 0.25
0.75 0.75
]
.
The core of the evaluation economy is then a single-element set given by
C(Esδ) =
{[
κasδ κ
b
sδ 5
κasδ κ
b
sδ 5
]}
,
where the values for κisδ depend on the fundamentals of the economyEδ as follows:
κisδ = (1 − δ)
∑
σ∈S
ψ(σ|s; δ)eiσ.
It is easy to check that κa1δ 	= κa2δ , implying that C(E1δ)
⋂
C(E2δ) = ∅ for all
δ ∈ (0, 1). Observe that the economies Eδ satisfy all assumptions of Theorem 2.
Corollary 1 therefore implies that the strong sequential core of the economy Eδ is
empty for all δ ∈ (0, 1).
6 Concluding remarks
To conclude, we point out some limitations and suggest a number of extensions of
the approach taken in this paper.
We consider an economy with inﬁnite time horizon where at each moment of
time the state reveals and determines the instantaneous utility functions and initial
endowments at that moment. The state follows a Markov process. Contrary to the
stochastic-games literature we assume that the transitional probabilities are entirely
exogenous in the sense that they cannot be inﬂuenced by the agent’s consumption
decisions. This makes a sub-economy starting at a particular point in time indepen-
dent of the commodity allocation chosen up to that point. Thus the dynamic links
between the time periods are rather limited.
While this may seem a restrictive assumption, it is not obvious exactly how the
decisions of the players or coalitions should inﬂuence the transitional probabilities,
given the cooperative nature of the economy in question. The study of dynamic
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economies with endogenous transitional probabilities is a subject of further re-
search.
Neither can the agents inﬂuence future sub-economies by trading assets. Indeed,
the assumption of themodel is that contracts allowing for intertemporal trade are not
enforceable. This should be seen as an extreme case of market incompleteness. As
the study of two–period economies indicates, however (see Predtetchinski, Herings,
and Peters, 2002), the strong sequential core is weakly increasing in the number of
enforceable securities. Thus, for the purpose of obtaining the non-emptiness result,
the case where there are no securities is the most difﬁcult one.
The possible emptiness of the strong sequential core calls for an examination
of weaker solution concepts. In the weak sequential core it is required that the
commodity allocation be robust only against those deviations which cannot be
improved upon by any sub-coalition of the deviating coalition. Thus, the number
of deviations to be considered is reduced, and a weakening of the strong sequential
core is obtained. The weak sequential core for dynamic games with transferable
utility is studied in Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2001), and for two-period exchange
economies in Predtetchinski, Herings, and Perea (2002).The translation of theweak
sequential core concept into the present framework is an interesting problem for
future research.
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